Roughly one fifth of the world’s seaborne oil trade passes through the Strait of Hormuz. When navigation through this narrow passage between Iran and Oman is threatened or disrupted, the effects reach businesses far beyond the energy sector: freight rates rise, insurance premiums surge, delivery schedules slip and input costs climb throughout entire supply chains.
Nor is this an isolated event. Only a few years ago, attacks on shipping in the Bab-el-Mandeb strait forced much of the world’s fleet to abandon the Red Sea route, cutting Suez Canal traffic by roughly two thirds and adding weeks of sailing time around the Cape of Good Hope. Chokepoint disruption has become a recurring feature of international trade. The difference with Hormuz is stark: for the Red Sea there was an alternative, however costly. For the oil and gas of the Gulf, apart from a handful of pipelines of limited capacity, there is none.
Recent instability in the region has once again raised a question that most businesses never expected to ask: can a coastal state lawfully close an international strait? And if not, why does the risk persist?
The answer lies in the law of the sea. Understanding its basic architecture helps businesses assess the real nature of the risk and take sensible contractual and operational precautions.
Freedom of navigation is the legal backbone of global trade
International trade as we know it rests on a simple premise: merchant vessels can move between open seas without asking permission from the states whose coasts they pass. Straits are where that premise is tested, because they are the natural bottlenecks where international shipping routes and national waters meet.
The principle that straits connecting two open seas must remain open to navigation has been recognised for well over a century. No coastal state today levies tolls on ships transiting an international strait, and the last state to do so abandoned the practice in the nineteenth century.
Modern law has codified this principle. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982 establishes a dedicated regime for straits used for international navigation, built around the right of transit passage. Under this regime, all ships enjoy the right to pass through such straits, and the coastal state may not suspend or hamper that passage, even where the waters of the strait fall entirely within its territorial sea. The coastal state may regulate navigation for safety purposes, for instance through traffic separation schemes approved by the International Maritime Organization, but it cannot close the door.
This is what distinguishes an international strait from ordinary territorial waters. In its own territorial sea, a coastal state may in narrowly defined circumstances temporarily suspend the passage of foreign ships where its security requires it. In an international strait, no such option exists. Neither transit passage nor innocent passage may be suspended there.
Why Hormuz is legally more complicated than it should be
If the rules are so clear, why does the Strait of Hormuz remain a persistent source of legal and commercial uncertainty? Three factors explain it.
First, Iran is not a party to the Law of the Sea Convention. Neither, for that matter, are the United States or the United Arab Emirates. Iran does not accept the transit passage regime and takes the position that foreign vessels enjoy only innocent passage through its territorial sea, a more limited right which Iran moreover claims the power to restrict. Iranian legislation additionally requires foreign warships to obtain prior authorisation before entering its territorial waters, a requirement at odds with generally accepted international law.
Second, the strait is bordered by two states, not one. Its waters are divided between the territorial seas of Iran to the north and Oman to the south. Oman ratified the Convention decades ago, recognises transit passage and operates the traffic separation scheme through which virtually all commercial shipping actually moves. In practice, international trade through Hormuz has for decades relied on the Omani half of the strait, which is also the deeper and safer side for navigation.
Third, even for states outside the Convention, freedom of navigation through international straits is widely regarded as customary international law, binding on all states regardless of treaty ratifications. On that basis, a deliberate closure of the strait, or measures such as mining the shipping lanes, would constitute a serious violation of international law, and where those measures affect the waters of the neighbouring state, a hostile act against that state as well.
The commercial reality behind the legal position
For businesses, the practical conclusion is double-edged.
On the one hand, the legal position is firmly on the side of open navigation. Closing the strait at its narrowest point is unlawful, would require interfering with Omani waters, and would cut off the coastal state’s own vital energy exports. History confirms the point: even during the most intense regional conflicts of recent decades, the strait was never fully closed, precisely because the state threatening closure depends on it more than almost anyone else.
On the other hand, legal rights do not steer ships. A right of passage that a coastal state contests, or that armed conflict makes dangerous to exercise, offers limited comfort to a shipowner, a charterer or a cargo interest deciding whether to route a vessel through the strait next week.
The risk, moreover, is not limited to outright closure. Iran does not recognise the exclusive jurisdiction of flag states over their vessels on the high seas, and its record includes repeated interference with merchant shipping: according to information submitted to the United Nations, some twenty foreign-flagged vessels were harassed or obstructed over a recent two-year period, several of which were seized outright. For operators and cargo interests, the risk of detention of a vessel, its cargo and its crew is a distinct exposure from the risk of closure, and it weighs directly on war risk premiums, crewing decisions and routing choices.
One scenario, however, can be largely discounted: the idea, occasionally floated, of a toll on passage through the strait. No toll has been levied on any international strait in modern times, the littoral states of other major straits have publicly refused to open that door, and any Hormuz toll would in practice require the cooperation of Oman, which has confirmed that its treaty commitments do not permit one. Businesses should treat this as noise rather than a planning scenario.
Uncertainty of this kind translates directly into war risk insurance premiums, rerouting costs, delays and, ultimately, price pressure throughout the supply chain. There is no realistic prospect of a special treaty regime for Hormuz comparable to the one governing the Turkish straits. What normalisation requires is not new legal instruments but compliance with existing law. Businesses should therefore plan on the assumption that the legal framework will remain as it is, and that the risk is political rather than legal in nature.
Practical steps for businesses exposed to the strait
Whether you trade in energy, ship goods to or from the Gulf, or simply depend on inputs that pass through the region, several measures deserve attention.
Map your exposure. Many companies discover their dependence on a chokepoint only when it is disrupted. Trace where your critical inputs and shipments actually travel, including those handled by suppliers and logistics providers, and identify which flows have no realistic alternative route.
Review force majeure and war risk clauses. Charterparties, sales contracts and supply agreements allocate the risk of blocked or dangerous routes in very different ways. Know before a crisis which party bears the cost of rerouting, delay or non-delivery, and whether a disruption of navigation qualifies as force majeure under your specific wording.
Check your Incoterms and insurance arrangements. The chosen delivery term determines where risk passes between seller and buyer, and standard cargo cover typically excludes war risks unless separately arranged. Confirm that cover, deductibles and geographic exclusions match your actual routes.
Build routing and sourcing flexibility. Where alternatives exist, contractual freedom to reroute, substitute ports or switch suppliers is worth negotiating in advance. For Gulf energy flows the alternatives are few, which makes early contractual clarity all the more important.
Follow the situation through reliable channels. Notices from flag states, insurers, the International Maritime Organization and industry bodies will generally signal changes in the risk picture earlier than general news coverage.
The key message
The law of the sea is clear: navigation through an international strait cannot lawfully be suspended, and the overwhelming majority of states stand behind that rule. The Strait of Hormuz nevertheless shows that legal clarity and commercial security are not the same thing. Where a strategic chokepoint is contested, the burden of managing the residual risk falls on the businesses whose goods move through it.
Companies that understand where their supply chains touch these pressure points, and whose contracts allocate the associated risks deliberately rather than by accident, are far better placed to absorb disruption than those who discover the gaps mid-crisis.
At LexPrime Consulting, we advise businesses on shipping and international trade matters, from charterparties, carriage and sale of goods contracts to Incoterms, trade structures and the contractual management of geopolitical risk throughout the Benelux, wider Europe and Africa.